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TEXT OF AUTHORITIES
1)

Utah Code Ann. §35-1-99(2) (1988):

In nonpermanent total disability cases, an employee's
medical benefit entitlement...ceases if the employee does
not incur, and submit to his employer or insurance carrier
for payment, for a period of three consecutive years,
medical expenses reasonably related to the industrial
accident.
2)

Utah Code Ann. §35-1-99 (1987):

If no claim for compensation is filed with the Industrial
Commission within three years after the date of accident of
the date of the last payment of compensation, the right to
compensation is wholly barred.
3)

Administrative Rule 568-1-9:

Pursuant to Section 35-1-77, the Commission adopts the
following guidelines in determining the necessity of
submitting the case to a medical panel:
A. A panel will be utilized by the Administrative Law Judge
where:
1. One or more significant medical issues may be
involved. Generally a significant medical issue must
be shown by conflicting medical reports. Significant
medical issues are involved when there are:
(c) Medical expenses in controversy amounting to
more than $2,000.
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(a) (1994).

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1)

Did the Commission correctly determine that the three-

year statute of limitations for submitting claims for workmens'
compensation benefits was inapplicable to this case?

2)

Should the Commission have submitted to a medical panel

the issue of the medical cause of the applicant's present need
for knee surgery?
STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1)

The Commission's decision concerning the applicability

of statutory law is reviewed under a correction of error
standard-

Uintah Oil Assoc, v. County Bd. of Equalization, 853

P.2d 894, 896 (Utah 1993).
2)

The Commission's application of its own agency rules is

subject to an intermediate "reasonable and rational" review.
Willardson v. Industrial Com'n., 856 P.2d 371, 376 (Utah App.
1993) .

The issue of whether the medical reports conflict is a

factual question, while the issue of whether the Board properly
determined a medical panel was inappropriate is a legal question.
PRESERVATION OF ISSUES BELOW
1)

The first issue was preserved at R. 8, 59.

2)

The second issue was preserved at R. 69-70.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A.

Nature of the Case.

This is an appeal from a workers' compensation decision of
the Industrial Commission awarding the applicant David Wardrop
medical expenses and temporary total compensation.

(R. 64). The

applicant suffered an industrial accident in 1987, claiming pain

-2-

in his knee.

He then suffered a non-industrial accident when he

slipped on the ice in 1992 and fell, necessitating knee surgery.
B.

Statement of Facts.

The applicant David Wardrop was employed by Brown & Root
(petitioners/appellants will be collectively referred to as
"Brown & Root") as a laborer in 1987.

(R. 54). After working

there for three weeks, he suffered an industrial accident in
April 1987.

(R. 54). As he was climbing out of a hole on the

worksite, he fell and claimed to feel pain in his knee.

(R. 54).

He continued to work and did not seek medical attention until
eleven days later, when his supervisor took him to Tanner Clinic
in Layton.

(R. 54-5) . Dr. Taylor of the Tanner Clinic examined

Mr. Wardrop and ordered an x-ray of the right knee.

(R. 55).

The x-ray was normal, and Dr. Taylor determined that Mr. Wardrop
could resume work immediately.

(R. 55).

After working for three more weeks, Mr. Wardrop independently sought another opinion from Dr. Bean, an orthopedist at
the Tanner Clinic.

(R. 55). Dr. Bean's diagnostic impression

was a partial or complete tear of the anterior cruciate ligament.
(R. 55). Dr. Bean recommended that orthoscopic surgery be
performed on the knee to determine the extent of injury.

(R.

55) .
On July 14, 1987, Dr. Gabbert, an orthopedic surgeon,
performed this surgery and found no pathology.

(R. 55-6) .

Specifically, Dr. Gabbert indicated that the anterior cruciate
ligament was intact, without any tears in the lateral or medial
-3-

meniscus.

(R. 56). Dr. Gabbert examined Mr. Wardrop again in

August 19 87 and reported normal walking, no swelling or
ligamentous instability, full range of motion and good quad
function.

(R. 56). Dr. Gabbert wrote to Brown & Root's

insurance adjustor the next month and notified it that he did not
anticipate any permanent impairment to the right knee.

(R. 56).

Mr. Wardrop requested that Brown & Root let him see yet
another doctor in October 1987.

(R. 56). Dr. Janeway of the

Ogden Clinic became the fourth doctor to examine Mr. Wardrop's
knee.

(R. 56). This time, there was a diagnosis of a

"disruption" to the right knee anterior cruciate ligament.
56).

(R.

Although Dr. Janeway indicated that surgery might be

advisable in the future, he suggested that Mr. Wardrop do knee
exercises for the time being.

(R. 56-7, 201) (cited pages of

transcript, Addendum A ) .
Except for a $30 bill from Dr. Bean, the doctor Wardrop saw
without prior approval from Brown & Root's adjustor,

Brown &

Root paid for all medical expenses incurred by Wardrop during
this time.

(R. 53, 173, 195). Wardrop submitted the last medi-

cal bill in September 1988.

(R. 53,173).

Brown & Root also paid

Wardrop for two weeks of temporary total disability in July 1987
while he recovered from the orthoscopic surgery.

(R. 53, 173,

223) .
After his employment with Brown & Root ended in 1987, Mr.
Wardrop held at least seven different employment positions
between 1988 and 1992, including a job mounting and dismounting
-4-

tires.

(R. 223-30).

On January 27, 1992, Mr. Wardrop sustained

a non-industrial injury to his knee; as he was getting out of his
car and stepping onto his inclined driveway, he slipped on ice
and fell.

(R. 57, 230). Dr. Mayer examined Mr. Wardrop in March

1992 and diagnosed an anterior cruciate insufficient right knee
with a probably stretched anterior cruciate ligament.

(R. 58).

Although Dr. Mayer recommended reconstructive surgery, he
authorized Mr. Wardrop to return to work without restrictions.
(R. 58).
C.

Procedural History.

Mr. Wardrop sought coverage for the surgery and rehabilitation period from Brown & Root based upon his contention that
the 1992 injury was caused by his industrial accident back in
1987.

(R. 178). When Brown & Root denied coverage, he commenced

this action with the Industrial Commission.

(R. 1).

In October 1993, Dr. Zeluff conducted an independent medical
examination of Mr. Wardrop at Brown & Root's request.
After viewing all relevant medical records,

(R. 58).

Dr. Zeluff stated

that there was a strong "possibility" that Mr. Wardrop had a
partial ligament tear in his knee in 1987.

(R. 59). Dr. Zeluff

also noted that Dr. Bean's finding of an anterior cruciate
ligament problem in 1987 conflicted with Dr. Gabbert's finding
shortly thereafter of no pathology.

(R. 58-9) .

At the hearing before Administrative Law Judge Elicerio
("ALJ"), Brown & Root explained that it denied coverage in part
based on Utah Code Ann. §35-1-99.
-5-

(R. 59) (Findings and

Conclusions, Addendum B).

This provision mandates a three-year

statute of limitations on workmens' compensation benefits, with
the limitations period running from the time the employee files
the latest request for coverage.1

(R. 59) . Although the ALJ

observed that the 1988 version of the provision would time-bar
Mr. Wardrop's claim for medical expenses if it were retroactive
to 1987, the ALJ determined that it was not retroactive.
60).

(R. 59-

In reaching this determination, the ALJ ruled that the law

existing at the time of Mr. Wardrop's 1987 accident applied.

(R.

60) .
Brown & Root also requested that the issue of whether the
1987 accident constituted the medical cause of Mr. Wardrop's 1992
injury be submitted to a medical panel.

(R. 60). The ALJ

declined to do so, stating that
[t]he conclusions of Dr. Zeluff and Dr. Janeway could be
seen as controverting opinions, warranting a referral to a
medical panel for additional input. However, Dr. Janeway is
unaware of the January 27, 1992 accident and it is unclear
whether he would feel that this subsequent accident
aggravated the anterior cruciate ligament (ACL) injury.
(R. 60).
The ALJ continued that even if the physicians did hold conflicting medical opinions on whether the 1992 slip aggravated the 1987

!

This statute of limitations has been amended several times.
In 1986, the three-year period was prescribed in §35-1-99, and
applied to "payments of compensation."
The legislature amended
the provision in 1988 as §35-1-99(2), applying the limitations
period to "medical expenses." The legislature changed the
provision's wording, but not the overall meaning, in 1990, and
moved it to §35-1-98(1). (R. 59-60).
-6-

injury, it was irrelevant because the effects of aggravating
incidents are compensable.

(R. 60-1) .

Because the ALJ misconstrued the nature of the medical
controversy, Brown & Root clarified in its Motion for Review to
the Board that there were conflicting medical opinions regarding
whether the 1992 slip was an independent injury unrelated to the
1987 industrial incident.

(R. 69-70) (Motion, Addendum C ) .

Thus, the medical controversy that concerned Brown & Root was not
whether the 1992 slip aggravated a 1987 injury, but whether the
1992 slip constituted the sole cause of Mr. Wardrop's need for
surgery.

(R. 71).

Upon Brown & Root's Motion for Review, the Board affirmed
the ALJ's decision.
Addendum D).

(R. 86-90) (Order on Motion for Review,

The Board agreed that §35-1-99 (1988) was not

retroactive, remarking that the law in effect at the time of the
industrial accident governs.

(R. 88). The Board also confirmed

the ALJ's refusal to submit the issue of whether the 1987
incident caused the 1992 injury to a medical panel, stating that
the medical opinions were in "substantial agreement" that Mr.
Wardrop's 1987 incident caused his current knee problems.
(R. 87-8).
Brown & Root sought judicial review of this case by filing a
Petition for Writ of Review with this Court on October 26, 1994.
(R. 93-6) .
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
POINT I:

Because §35-1-99 (1988) is a procedural statute of

limitations, it can be made retroactive to prevent Mr. Wardrop's
untimely claim for medical expenses.

Even if this Court were to

accept the Board's position that the limitations period in effect
at the time of injury governs, §35-1-99 (1987) applies to timebar Mr. Wardrop's claim for temporary total compensation.
Regardless of the propriety of the Board's decision that §35-1-99
(1988) is not retroactive, the Board acted improperly in awarding
Mr. Wardrop both medical expenses and temporary total
compensation.
POINT II: The medical opinions regarding whether the 1987
incident constituted the "genesis" of the 1992 injury are
conflicting because the physicians express varying degrees of
uncertainty on this issue.

The Industrial Commission erred in

refusing to refer this significant medical controversy to a
medical panel for resolution.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
§35-1-99 (1988) APPLIES
RETROACTIVELY TO TIME-BAR MR. WARDROP'S
CLAIM FOR THE MEDICAL EXPENSES OF HIS SURGERY.
The limitations period in effect at the time of Mr.
Wardrop's 1987 industrial incident provided that:
If no claim for compensation is filed with the Industrial
Commission within three years after the date of the accident
or the date of the last payment of compensation, the right
to compensation is wholly barred.
-8-

Utah Code Ann. §35-1-99 (1986) (emphasis added).
Utah courts have construed "compensation" to exclude medical
expenses.

Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Industrial Com'n, 597 P.2d

875 (Utah 1979).
In 1988, the Utah Legislature amended this provision
expressly to encompass medical expenses:
In nonpermanent total disability cases, an employee's
medical benefit entitlement...ceases if the employee does
not incur, and submit to his employer or insurance carrier
for payment, for a period of three consecutive years,
medical expenses reasonably related to the industrial
accident.
Utah Code Ann. §35-1-99(2) (1988).
Consequently, if this Court applies §35-1-99 (1988) retroactively
to the date of Mr. Wardrop's industrial accident, his claim for
medical expenses of the knee surgery is time-barred.
A.
This Court Should Prohibit Mr. Wardrop's Untimely Claim
For Medical Expenses.
The Commission maintains that the law in effect at the time
of Mr. Wardrop's claim governs compensability.

While this

principle is generally true, there is an exception for procedural
laws such as statutes of limitation.

Neither the ALJ nor the

Board mentioned this or any other exception in their decisions.
They based their determination that §35-1-99(2) (1988) could not
apply retroactively on a general legal principle without
considering whether the exceptions might apply.
In Kofoed v. Industrial Com'n. of Utah, 872 P.2d 484, 486
(Utah App. 1994) (citations omitted), this Court reiterated one
of these exceptions; if a statute is procedural in nature, it
-9-

will apply retroactively to the date of injury.

The rationale

behind this exception is that procedural statutes do not destroy
substantive rights, so retroactive application would not
completely eliminate a cause of action.

Pilcher v. State Dept.

of Social Services. 663 P.2d 450, 455 (Utah 1983).
The Supreme Court has designated statutes of limitations as
procedural in nature.

In Lee v. Gaufin, 867 P.2d 572 (Utah

1993), the court explained that limitations periods
do not abolish a substantive right to sue, but simply
provide that if an action is not filed within the specified
time, the remedy is deemed to have been waived.... Thus,
the barring of the remedy is caused by a plaintiff's failure
to take reasonable steps to assert the cause of action
within the time afforded by the statute.
Id. at 575. See also Financial Bancorp v. Pingree & Dahle,
880 P.2d 14, 16 (Utah App. 1994) (citation omitted)
(limitations periods are procedural).
Applying §35-1-99 (1988) retroactively to time-bar the claim
of medical expenses would not work to deprive Mr. Wardrop of a
substantive right.

He was placed on notice in 1988, when the

provision went into effect, that Utah enforced a three-year
limitations period for submission of medical expense claims. If
Mr. Wardrop suspected in 1988, as he claims he did (R. 201), that
he might need knee surgery in the future due to the 1987
accident, he should have requested an extension of time from
Brown & Root in which to submit medical expenses. Alternatively,
if the 1987 injury so debilitated him even before his 1992 slip
on ice, as he claims it did (R. 203), he should have opted for
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the surgery sooner.

Instead, he waited more than three years,

after being notified by Dr. Janeway that he might need surgery
and after being placed on notice of the limitations period,
before finally deciding to have the knee surgery in 1992.

§35-1-

99 (1988) afforded him three years to decide whether he needed
knee surgery.

When the three years passed, his claim to

compensation became stale.
At the same time, not applying §35-1-99 (1988) retroactively
would prejudice Brown & Root. As with all statutes of
limitations, the policy justification for the three-year
limitations period on submission of medical expenses is to
protect the employer from stale claims.
P.2d 1357, 1369 (Utah App. 1993).

Currier v. Holden, 862

Furthermore, the limitations

period contains an implicit presumption that medical expenses
incurred more than three years from the last date of payment are
too causally remote from the industrial injury to be compensable.
In this case, the applicant fell on ice five years after he
injured his knee at work, more than three years after he stopped
seeking medical treatment, and some time after working in various
employment positions.

Lest Brown & Root face perpetual

responsibility for Mr. Wardrop's knee problems, the limitations
period in §35-1-99 (1988) cuts off Mr. Wardrop's ability to seek
workmens' compensation from a long-past employer.
Since §35-1-99(2) (1988) is a procedural law, the Commission
erred in determining that it did not apply retroactively to
preclude Mr. Wardrop's belated claim for medical expenses.
-11-

B.
Even If This Court Determines That The Law In Effect At
The Time Of Mr. Wardrop's Injury Governs His Action, The
Limitations Period Still Time-Bars His Claim For Temporary Total
Compensation.
Even if this Court concludes that the procedural exception
to the principle that the law in effect at the time of injury is
inapplicable, Mr. Wardrop is still not entitled to the
Commission's entire award of workmens' compensation benefits.
Besides requiring Brown & Root to pay for Mr. Wardrop's knee
surgery expenses, the Commission ordered it to pay Mr. Wardrop
temporary total compensation during his recovery from surgery.
However, the law in effect at the time of Mr. Wardrop's
industrial accident, §35-1-99 (1986), specifies a three-year time
limit for seeking "compensation," commencing from the date of the
last payment of compensation.

Brown & Root's latest payment of

compensation to Mr. Wardrop came in July 1987, when it paid him
temporary total compensation after his orthoscopic surgery.

The

statute of limitations on any claim for temporary total
compensation ran in 1990. Due to the more than three-year hiatus
in his demands for temporary total compensation, his current
claim for this type of compensation is "wholly barred" under §351-99 (1986).
This Court should apply §35-1-99(2) (1988) retroactively to
Mr. Wardrop's 1987 injury date because it is a procedural statute
of limitations.

Since Mr. Wardrop failed to submit medical bills

for a three-year period, his current request for knee surgery
coverage is untimely.

On the other hand, if this Court accepts

-12-

the Commission's legal conclusion that the statute is not
retroactive, this Court must necessarily apply §35-1-99 (1986),
which precludes Mr. Wardrop's claim for temporary total
compensation.

Regardless of which law this Court deems

applicable, the fact remains that the Commission awarded Mr.
Wardrop more relief than what he was entitled to receive under
statute.
POINT II
THE COMMISSION ERRED BY REFUSING
TO SUBMIT A SIGNIFICANT MEDICAL CONTROVERSY
TO THE MEDICAL PANEL.
The ALJ declined to assemble a medical panel in this case
even though the opinions of Dr. Zeluff and Dr. Janeway "could be
seen as controverting;"

the ALJ felt that any controversy

regarding the aggravating degree of the 1992 slip was irrelevant
to compensability.

(R. 60). The Board affirmed the ALJ's

decision not to submit the medical evidence to a panel, stating
that the medical opinions were in "substantial agreement."2

(R.

88) .
However, the medical controversy Brown & Root requested a
medical panel resolve was not the degree to which the 1992 slip
aggravated a 1987 injury.

Instead, Brown & Root recognized

differing medical opinions on whether the 1992 slip was an
2

To the extent Brown & Root challenges the Board's factual
finding that the medical reports were in "substantial agreement,"
Subpart A of Point II marshals the medical evidence from all
physicians examining Mr. Wardrop's knee and shows the evidence to
be in substantial disagreement.
-13-

independent injury.

(R. 67-70) . Because this controversy

affects whether the 1992 injury was work-related, it is
significant to compensability in this case.
A.
The Medical Reports Conflict On Whether The 1987
Incident Constituted A Knee Injury Requiring Eventual Surgery.
In part due to the number of physicians Mr. Wardrop felt it
was necessary to consult after his 1987 incident, medical
opinions regarding its severity run the gamut.

The first

physician to examine Mr. Wardrop in 1987, Dr. Taylor, diagnosed a
right knee strain and recommended Mr. Wardrop return to work with
no heavy lifting.

(R. 55). An x-ray of his knee read normal.

(R. 55). He next visited Dr. Bean, who did not recommend
reconstructive surgery.

However, Dr. Bean felt, unlike Dr.

Taylor, that the injury warranted orthoscopic surgery because he
suspected a torn medial meniscus and torn anterior cruciate.

(R.

55).
After Dr. Gabbert completed the orthoscopic surgery, he did
not find any pathology.

Particularly, he discovered no tear in

either the medial meniscus or the anterior cruciate.

(R. 56).

Dr. Gabbert continued to see Mr. Wardrop after the orthoscopic
surgery and concluded that Mr. Wardrop would not suffer permanent
impairment to his knee.

(R. 56).

Finally, Dr. Janeway examined Mr. Wardrop in late 1987 and
diagnosed a "disruption" of the anterior cruciate ligament.
Unlike prior examining physicians, Dr. Janeway indicated that the
knee "probably" required surgery.

-14-

(R. 56).

Mr. Wardrop did not see another physician for his knee until
four years later, after he slipped on ice in 1992. Dr. Mayer
suspected a "stretched-out" anterior cruciate ligament.
Nonetheless, he authorized Mr. Wardrop to return to work without
restrictions.

(R. 58). After initiating his workers'

compensation claim, Mr. Wardrop was examined by Dr. Zeluff in
1993.

Dr. Zeluff noted a "strong possibility" that Mr. Wardrop

exhibited a partial tear in the anterior cruciate ligament in
1987.

(R. 59).

After outlining the differing opinions regarding the
severity of Mr. Wardrop's 1987 injury, it is difficult to imagine
how the Board found them to be in "substantial agreement."

At

one end, Dr. Taylor and Dr. Gabbert found no pathology and did
not expect permanent impairment.

At the other end, Dr. Janeway

diagnoses a "probable" need for surgery.

In the middle lie Dr.

Bean's impression of definite tears in the medial meniscus and
anterior cruciate, contrasted with Dr. Mayer's 1992 suspicion of
a "probable" "stretched-out" anterior cruciate, contrasted with
Dr. Zeluff's 1993 impression of a "possible" tear in just the
anterior cruciate.
The physicians' differing opinions on the severity of the
1987 knee injury cannot be reconciled because they vary on
whether there was a detectable injury at all in 1987, on the
certainty of injury, on whether surgery was necessary before
1992, on what parts of the knee were injured, and on the extent
to which these parts were injured.
-15-

In a case with a similar

uncertainty regarding the work-related nature of an injury,
Lancaster v. Gilbert Development. 736 P.2d 237 (Utah 1987), the
examining physicians displayed varying degrees of certainty that
the claimant's work contributed to his myocardial infarction.
While one physician felt the work did not contribute to the
injury at all, another felt it "likely" contributed, while
another felt it "probably" contributed.

The Court characterized

this medical evidence as "less than conclusive" and
"conflicting."

Id^. at 239, 240.

The significant medical issue in this case is the cause of
Mr. Wardrop's current need for knee surgery.

The examining

physicians' opinions differ on whether Mr. Wardrop was injured
severely enough in 1987 that he would ever require knee surgery.
Submission of this issue to a medical panel for resolution was
therefore warranted.

See Champion Home Builders v. Indus.

Com'n., 703 P.2d 306, 308 (Utah 1985) (may be abuse of discretion
not to use medical panel where evidence of causal connection
between work-related event and injury uncertain); Intermountain
Health v. Bd. of Review. 839 P.2d 841, 843 (Utah App. 1992) (in
dicta) (issue of causal connection between back problems after
non-work exertion and back problems after prior work-related
accident properly determined by medical panel).
B.
The Commission Erred By Not Referring The Issue To A
Medical Panel When Such Reference Is Mandatory.
Agency rule provides that

-16-

A panel will be utilized by the Administrative Law Judge
where...one or more significant medical issues may be
involved.
R568-1-9A (R. 88).
This language is not permissive; submission to a medical panel
becomes mandatory when examining physicians hold conflicting
opinions on important medical issues in workmens' compensation
cases.

Ashcroft v. Industrial Com'n. of Utah. 855 P.2d 267, 269

(Utah App. 1993).

Since submission to a medical panel was

mandatory in this case, the Commission erred by not employing a
medical panel to resolve a significant medical issue.
CONCLUSION AND RELIEF REQUESTED
The Commission's entire award of workmens' compensation
benefits to Mr. Wardrop cannot stand.

Either the law in effect

at the time of his injury time-bars his claim for temporary total
compensation, or the law applied retroactively time-bars his
claim for medical expenses.

Furthermore, the Commission based

its award of both types of benefits on its conclusion that Mr.
Wardrop7s need for surgery and rehabilitation is work-related,
but the medical aspects of this determination should have been
referred to a medical panel.

Based upon the foregoing, Brown &

Root asks this Court to apply §35-1-99(2) (1988) retroactively to
time-bar the medical expenses claim, and to remand to the
Commission for the appropriate award reduction.

Alternatively,

if this Court determines that the law in effect at the time of
Mr. Wardrop's injury governs, it should conclude that §35-1-99
(1986) renders untimely his claim for temporary total
-17-

compensation and remand to the Commission for appropriate award
reduction.

Finally, this Court should remand with instructions

to submit the medical issues to a medical panel, to determine if
the remaining claim for benefits is indeed work-related and
therefore compensable.
DATED this

day of February, 1995.
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU

By

V u^^

r . £><LG*****^

S t i u a r t L. Poelman
J u l i a n n e P. Blanch
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1

P R O C E E D I N G S

2

THE COURT:

PUT THIS ON THE RECORD.

THIS IS

3

CASE NO. 93-561, DAVID WARDROP VS. BROWN & ROOT INDUSTRIAL

4

SERVICE AND HIGHLANDS INSURANCE.

5
6

AND I TAKE IT BLACK, NICOLS & GUIVER IS THE
ADJUSTING COMPANY ON THAT.

7

MR. POELMAN:

8

THE COURT:

9
10

MR. JENSEN:

THAT'S RIGHT.

I'M HERE, YOUR

HONOR.
THE COURT:

WE HAVE STUART POELMAN FOR BLACK,

NICOLS & GUIVER HERE.

15
16

MR. WARDROP ISN'T HERE JUST YET,

JENSEN, ATTORNEY, IS PRESENT.

13
14

CORRECT.

BUT HE'S ON HIS WAY, AND HE IS REPRESENTED BY -- G. SCOTT

11
12

IS THAT RIGHT?

LET ME ASK MR. POELMAN TO BEGIN WITH:

WHAT'S

BEEN PAID ON THIS CLAIM?

17

MR. POELMAN:

THERE WAS A SHORT PERIOD OF

18

TEMPORARY TOTAL DISABILITY BACK IN 1987.

19

THE 14TH AND -- IT WAS TERMINATED ABOUT TWO OR THREE WEEKS

20

LATER, I BELIEVE.

21

INITIAL MEDICALS WERE PAID BACK IN 1987.

22

MEDICALS PAID SINCE -- SINCE SEPTEMBER THE 20TH OF 1988.

23

(INAUDIBLE.)

24

AT LEAST THAT WAS THE DATE THAT IT WAS PAID.

25

YEAH -- JULY THE 27TH.

I THINK BETWEEN JULY

AND THEN THE
THERE HAVE BEEN NO

I'M NOT SURE WHAT THE DATE OF THAT BILL WAS, BUT

THE COURT:

I SEE HE SAW -- SAW SOME DOCTOR IN

ROCKY MOUNTAIN REPORTING SERVICE, INC.
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1

THE SURGERY WHILE HE HAD SOME TIME; HE COULD GET AWAY FROM

2

WORK.

3

UNTIL HE HAD TIME TO RECUPERATE.

THAT'S WHY HE WANTED TO DO IT.

4

THE COURT:

OKAY.

BUT HE JUST PUT IT OFF

NOW, I THINK THE INITIAL

5

ANSWER ISN'T REAL CLEAR, AS THEY USUALLY ARE NOT, BECAUSE

6

THERE IS NO DISCOVERY THAT'S GONE ON AT THAT POINT.

7
8

MR. POELMAN, MAYBE YOU COULD EXPLAIN WHY THE
SURGERY'S BEEN DENIED.

9

MR. POELMAN:

BECAUSE HE -- THE REASON HE WENT

10

TO THE DOCTOR IN FEBRUARY OF '92 WAS BECAUSE HE HAD HAD

11

ANOTHER ACCIDENT.

12

INJURED HIS KNEE AND THEN WENT TO THE DOCTOR.

13

ATTEMPT HERE IS TO RELATE THAT BACK TO THE '87 INCIDENT.

HE HAD SLIPPED ON SOME ICE AND -- AND

14

THE COURT:

15

MR. POELMAN:

16

UH-HUM.

OF COURSE HIS

(AFFIRMATIVE.)

BUT WE SENT THE MATTER TO DR.

ZELUFF --

17

THE COURT:

18

MR. POELMAN:

UH-HUM.

(AFFIRMATIVE.)

-- FOR I.M.E.

THAT WAS

19

PERFORMED.

HIS -- HIS REPORTS ARE IN THE FILE. AND HE

20

INDICATED THERE WAS SIGNIFICANT AGGRAVATION OF THE KNEE

21

PROBLEM AS A RESULT OF HIS SLIPPING ON THE ICE.

22

THE COURT: OKAY.

23

MR. POELMAN:

24

SUBSEQUENT INTERVENING --

25

SO IT WAS DENIED BECAUSE OF

THE COURT: OKAY.

ROCKY MOUNTAIN REPORTING SERVICE, INC,
TEN EXCHANGE PLACE, SUITE 322
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84111
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1

HAD STILL BEEN BOTHERING ME.

2

DOING THAT AND TOLD ME THAT HE WOULD TALK ABOUT IT MONDAY WHEN

3

I GOT TO WORK.

4

Q

5

PAID DR. BEAN?

HE WAS VERY UPSET WITH ME FOR

DID YOU EVER RECEIVE COMPENSATION FOR WHAT YOU

6

A

NO, I DID NOT.

7

Q

SO YOU'VE NEVER BEEN REIMBURSED FOR THAT?

8

A

NEVER.

9

Q

DO YOU REMEMBER APPROXIMATELY HOW MUCH YOU PAID

11

A

I BELIEVE IT WAS $30.

12

Q

OKAY.

13

A

WHEN I REPORTED TO WORK MONDAY I HAD A —

10

HIM?

THE

14

PAPERWORK FROM DR. -- DR. BEAN SAYING THAT I NEEDED

15

ARTHROSCOPIC SURGERY; THAT I NEEDED TO BE PUT ON LIGHT DUTY.

16

AT WHICH TERM -- AT WHICH POINT I WAS FIRED.

17

Q

YOU WERE FIRED?

18

A

FIRED.

19

Q

WHAT WAS THE REASON GIVEN FOR YOUR TERMINATION?

20
21
22

MR. POELMAN:

I OBJECT TO THAT ON THE GROUNDS

THAT IT'S NOT THE BEST EVIDENCE.
THE COURT:

WELL, YOU KNOW, I THINK WE'RE

23

GETTING INTO SOME IRRELEVANT STUFF HERE.

I'D SORT OF LIKE TO

24

GET ON TO THE -- ALL THIS IS -- YOU KNOW, HE'S BEEN PAID FOR

25

THIS PERIOD OF TIME, AND IT'S NOT PART OF THE CLAIM.

ROCKY MOUNTAIN REPORTING SERVICE, INC.
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1

THING THAT HE TOLD ME WAS THAT WHEN HE FELT MY RIGHT KNEE FOR

2

MOVEMENT OR WHATEVER, THAT MY RIGHT KNEE WAS —

3

MR. POELMAN:

YOUR HONOR, I'M GOING TO HAVE TO

4

OBJECT AGAIN.

NOW WE'RE GETTING INTO A DETAIL OF THE

5

DIAGNOSIS; ALL OF WHICH, OF COURSE, IS IN THE MEDICAL RECORDS.

6

THE COURT:

7

I'D JUST LIKE HIM TO SKIM OVER THIS PART, MR.

8

UH-HUH.

(AFFIRMATIVE.)

JENSEN.

9 I

MR. JENSEN:

10

THE COURT:

OKAY.
(INAUDIBLE.)

11

Q

(BY MR. JENSEN)

12

A

HE ADVISED ME THAT -- TO DO EXERCISES FOR MY KNEE

13
14
15

QUICKLY, WHAT HAPPENED THEN?

TO STRENGTHEN THE MUSCLE -Q

DID HE EVER ADVISE YOU YOU MAY NEED SURGERY IN

THE FUTURE?

16

A

YES, HE DID.

HE --

17

Q

DID HE TELL YOU WHEN?

18

A

HE COULDN'T BE SPECIFIC.

HE SAID THAT THE -- THE

19

INJURY WASN'T AS BAD AS HE HAD SEEN, BUT THERE WAS A DEFINITE

20

INJURY.

21

Q

IT WOULD -- HE SAID IT WOULD GET WORSE?

22

A

YES.

23

HE SAID THAT THE KNEE WOULD GET WORSE --

AND HE -- HIS RECOMMENDATION WAS TO HOLD

OFF ON THE SURGERY.

24

Q

WHY?

DID HE SAY?

25

A

BECAUSE MY — YOU KNOW, MY KNEE WASN'T AS BAD AS

ROCKY MOUNTAIN REPORTING SERVICE, INC.
TEN EXCHANGE PLACE, SUITE 322
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84111
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1

A

YES.

2

Q

TO SEEK EMPLOYMENT THERE?

3

A

UH-HUM.

4

Q

AND DID YOU FIND EMPLOYMENT?

5

A

YES, I DID.

6

Q

WHERE DID YOU WORK?

7

A

MY FIRST JOB WAS FOR GOODYEAR.

8

Q

OKAY.

9
10

(AFFIRMATIVE.)

NOW, YOU WENT A LITTLE BIT OF TIME

BEFORE -- HOW LONG WAS IT UNTIL YOU HAD SIGNIFICANT PROBLEMS
AFTER YOU SAW JANEWAY?

11

A

I'VE HAD PROBLEMS ALL ALONG.

12

Q

OKAY.

13

A

I -- MY KNEE WOULD STILL LOCK, AND THEN MY KNEE

14

STARTED POPPING OUT.

15
16

Q

LET'S -- LET'S GO TO A -- IT'S BEEN ALLEGED THAT

A REPORT WAS MADE.

17
18

LET'S -- LET'S GET TO --

WHERE WAS THAT REPORT THAT SAID THE SLIP ON THE
ICE?

WE'LL GO RIGHT TO THAT.

19

MR. POBLMAN:

20

MR. JENSEN:

21

IN THE MEDICAL RECORDS.
WHICH -- I'M TRYING TO REMEMBER

WHICH MEDICAL RECORD THAT WAS.

22

MR. POELMANs

23

WAS FROM -- (INAUDIBLE.)

24

MR. JENSEN:

25 I

MR. POELMAN:

WELL, LET'S SEE, I BELIEVE THAT

DR. —
DR. SILLIX.

ROCKY MOUNTAIN REPORTING SERVICE, INC.
TEN EXCHANGE PLACE, SUITE 322
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84111
(801) 531-0256

A<V?fjQ
UU^Ud
33

1
2

HAPPENED WHEN YOU WENT TO SEE THEM?
A

I TOLD THEM THAT I WAS CLIMBING OUT OF A PIT, AND

3

I HAD SLIPPED AND FALLEN BACK INTO THE PIT.

4

TO THEM THAT THE PIT WAS TEN TO TWELVE FEET DEEP.

5

NEVER EXPLAINED TO THEM THAT AT THE TIME I FELL, I HAD -- MY

6

KNEES WERE ON THE EDGE OF THE PIT TO CLIMB OUT, SO I WAS

7

ALMOST OUT OF THE PIT WHEN I FELL BACK INTO THE PIT.

8
9

Q

AND I EXPLAINED
WHAT -- I

DO YOU RECALL THAT AFTER YOU'D SEEN DR. BEAN AND

THEN YOU TALKED TO BARBARA BLACK AND THEN YOU WERE REFERRED

10

OVER TO FURTHER TREATMENT BY DR. GABBERT -- HE DID THE SURGERY

11

AND SO FORTH.

12

DURING THAT PERIOD OF TIME THAT YOU WERE OFF WORK AFTER YOUR

13

ARTHROSCOPIC SURGERY?

14
15
16

A

WERE YOU PAID SOME TEMPORARY TOTAL DISABILITY

I BELIEVE I WAS PAID THE $155 A WEEK FOR -- I

DON'T REMEMBER THE LENGTH OF TIME.
Q

OUR RECORD WOULD INDICATE THAT THAT WAS UNTIL THE

17

27TH OF JULY; FROM THE 14TH TO THE 27TH.

18

APPROXIMATELY RIGHT ACCORDING TO YOUR MEMORY?

19

A

SURE.

20

Q

OKAY.

WOULD THAT BE

SINCE THE -- OR AFTER YOUR TREATMENT HERE

21

IN UTAH -- AND THEN YOU SAY YOU MOVED TO COLORADO.

22

YOU MOVE TO COLORADO?

23

A

'89.

24

Q

WHAT —

25

WHEN DID

WHAT EMPLOYMENT DID YOU PURSUE AFTER YOU

WERE TERMINATED AT BROWN & ROOT?

ROCKY MOUNTAIN REPORTING SERVICE, INC.
TEN EXCHANGE PLACE, SUITE 3 2 2
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1

A

UM --

2

Q

DID YOU HAVE ANY MORE EMPLOYMENT IN -- IN UTAH

3

BEFORE YOU MOVED TO COLORADO?

4

A

YEAH, I WENT TO WORK AT TAS GOODYEAR.

5

Q

EXCUSE ME?

6

A

TAS GOODYEAR, T-A-S GOODYEAR.

7

Q

OH, OKAY.

8

A

1690 WASHINGTON BOULEVARD, OGDEN, UTAH.

9

Q

WHAT DID YOU DO THERE?

10

A

ASSISTANT MANAGER; PRETTY MUCH EVERYTHING.

11

AND WHERE IS THAT?

I --

I HAD WORKED THERE PREVIOUSLY TO WORKING FOR BROWN & ROOT --

12

Q

I SEE.

13

A

-- AND I WENT BACK.

14

Q

HOW LONG DID YOU WORK THERE?

15

A

I WORKED THERE -- I BELIEVE IT WAS APPROXIMATELY

16
17
18
19
20

A YEAR BEFORE I MOVED TO COLORADO.
Q

ANY OTHER EMPLOYMENTS IN UTAH BEFORE YOU WENT TO

COLORADO?
A

I DON'T -- I BELIEVE THAT WAS THE GENERAL PORTION

OF WHAT HAPPENED.

21

Q

WHAT --

22

A

I WENT BACK TO GOODYEAR.

23

Q

WHAT KIND OF WORK DID YOU DO FOR TAS GOODYEAR?

24

A

I WAS AN ASSISTANT STORE MANAGER.

25

CHARGE OF THE STORE PRETTY MUCH.

I WAS IN

I DID THAT FOR ABOUT SIX
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A

1

MONTHS, AND THEN I MOVED TO A MECHANIC POSITION, AS I RECALL.

2

Q

I SEE.

3

A

PRETTY MUCH -- I HAD BEEN WORKING IN SHOPS SINCE

4

I WAS 16 YEARS OLD, AND I CAN PRETTY MUCH DO ANY JOB IN AN

5

AUTOMOTIVE SHOP.

6

Q

OKAY.

7

ME.

8

WITH TAS GOODYEAR?

9
10

THEN YOU MOVED TO COLORADO -- OR EXCUSE

WHY WERE YOU -- WHY DID YOU TERMINATE YOUR EMPLOYMENT

A

I HAD SOME DIFFERENCES OF OPINIONS WITH THE SHOP

MANAGER --

11

Q

WERE YOU FIRED?

12

A

-- WHEN I MOVED TO MECHANIC.

13

MR. JENSEN:

14

THE WITNESS:

15

MR. JENSEN:

16
17
18
19

Q

WAS I FIRED?

THAT'S IRRELEVANT, YOUR HONOR -NO, I QUIT.
-- OBJECT.

(BY MR. POLEHAN)

THEN YOU WENT TO COLORADO,

YOU SAY?
A

CORRECT.

I LEFT GOODYEAR IN -- IN JUNE, AND I

WENT TO COLORADO ON VACATION IN JULY.

20

Q

OF '89?

21

A

OF '88.

22

Q

OH, OKAY.

23

A

OR WAS IT '89?

24

Q

AND WHO DID YOU BECOME EMPLOYED WITH IN -- IN

25

I GUESS '89, YEAH.

COLORADO?
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1

A

BAILEY TIRE & SERVICE WAS MY FIRST JOB.

2

Q

AND WHAT -- HOW LONG DID YOU WORK THERE?

3

A

I DON'T REMEMBER EXACTLY; EIGHT MONTHS, SIX

4

MONTHS.

5

Q

AND WHAT KIND OF WORK DID YOU DO?

6

A

I STARTED OUT AS A TIRE BUSTER.

7

Q

A TIRE WHAT?

8

A

BUSTER; MOUNTING, DISMOUNTING TIRES.

9

Q

OKAY.

10

A

WORKING ON SEMI TIRES.

11
12
13

AFTER TWO OR THREE MONTHS

I MOVED TO ASSISTANT STORE MANAGER THERE.
Q

OKAY.

AND WHAT WAS THE REASON FOR YOUR TERMINA-

TION FROM THAT?

14

A

I WAS FIRED.

15

Q

WHERE DID YOU GO TO WORK AFTER THAT?

16

A

METRIC AUTOMOTIVE.

17

Q

AND HOW LONG DID YOU WORK THERE?

18

A

FOUR YEARS; THREE, FOUR YEARS.

19

Q

YEAH.

20

A

UP UNTIL AUGUST OF -- IT WOULD BE LIKE A YEAR AND

21

A HALF AGO.

UP -- UP UNTIL WHEN?

THAT WOULD BE

22

THE COURT:

23

THE WITNESS:

24
25

'93, YEAH.
Q

—

'92.
RIGHT.

CAUSE I CAME OVER HERE IN

AUG -- THE END OF AUGUST OF '92.
(BY MR. POELMAM)

MY RECORD INDICATED OCTOBER
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1

OF '92. WOULD THAT BE MORE ACCURATE?

2

A

(INAUDIBLE.)

I ACTUALLY LEFT METRIC IN AUGUST, BUT I WAS STILL

3

PAINTING CARS FOR THE OWNER OF METRIC FOR A MONTH AND A HALF

4

UNTIL OCTOBER OR WHATEVER.

5
6

Q

I SEE.

OKAY.

WHAT KIND OF WORK DID YOU DO

WORKING FOR METRIC?

7

A

EVERYTHING.

I MANAGED THE PARTS STORE.

8

MANAGED THE SHOP, THE TWELVE-DAY SHOP.

9

MECHANIC.

PAINTING CARS FOR DARIN.

I

I WORKED AS A

I DID PRETTY MUCH

10

ANYTHING HE ASKED ME TO DO.

WHEN I WAS ORIGINALLY HIRED I WAS

11

ORIGINALLY HIRED TO HANDLE PARTS.

12

WHICH I BECAME THE ASSISTANT MANAGER, THEN EVENTUALLY BECAME

13

THE MANAGER.

HE OPENED UP A PARTS STORE

14 I

Q

I SEE.

15

A

AND ALSO SERVICE MANAGER OF THE SHOP.

16

Q

OKAY.

AND WHY WERE YOU TERMINATED THERE OR WHAT

17

WAS THE REASON FOR YOUR TERMINATION?

18

MR. JENSEN:

19

MR. POELMAN:

24
25

I THINK IT GOES TO THE ISSUE I

MENTIONED EARLIER.

22
23

THAT'S IRRELEVANT,

YOUR HONOR.

20
21

OBJECTION.

THE COURT:
I'M —

HE CAN GO AHEAD AND ANSWER IT.

I'M NOT SURE WHAT THE RELEVANCE IS, BUT. . .
THE WITNESS:

DISAGREEMENT ON BUSINESS

PHILOSOPHIES.
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1
2

Q

(BY MR. POLEMAN)

WERE YOU INVOLUNTARILY

TERMINATED THEN?

3

A

INVOLUNTARILY TERMINATED?

4

0

YES.

5

A

I LEFT.

6

Q

DID YOU APPLY FOR UNEMPLOYMENT COM -- OR

7

UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION AFTER THAT?

8

A

NO, SIR.

9

Q

YOU DIDN'T?

10

A

NOT -- (INAUDIBLE.)

11
12
13
14
15

I HAVE APPLIED FOR

UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION, YEAH.
Q

DID YOU APPLY FOR UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION IN

COLORADO?
A

YEAH, I DID.

I APPLIED IN DECEMBER OF LAST YEAR

OR THE END OF NOVEMBER.

16

Q

OF '92?

17

A

3.

18

Q

'93?

19

A

'93.

20

Q

OKAY.

21

A

I —

I -- I HAD SOLD THE BMW THAT I OWNED.

22

ACTUALLY DARIN, THE OWNER OF METRIC, AND I WERE -- WE BOTH

23

OWNED THE CAR TOGETHER.

24

OWNED 20.

25

Q

I OWNED 80 PERCENT OF THE CAR; HE

OKAY.
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1

A

I -- IMMEDIATELY AFTER LEAVING METRIC AUTOMOTIVE

2

I DIDN'T APPLY FOR UNEMPLOYMENT.

I DIDN'T DO IT UNTIL LIKE A

3

YEAR AND TWO MONTHS LATER OR WHATEVER.

4

Q

WHEN?

5

A

A YEAR AND TWO MONTHS LATER.

6

Q

OKAY.

7
8
9
10
11
12

AND SO THAT WAS IN NOVEMBER OF '93 THAT

YOU APPLIED FOR IT?
A

END OF NOVEMBER, FIRST OF DECEMBER.

I BELIEVE IT

WAS ACTUALLY LIKE RIGHT AROUND THE FIRST OF DECEMBER.
Q

OKAY.

THEN WHAT DID YOU DO AFTER YOU LEFT METRIC

AUTOMOTIVE?
A

WORKED IN ANOTHER SHOP IN COLORADO FOR -- I

13

PAINTED CARS FOR DARIN UNTIL LIKE OCTOBER.

14

NOVEMBER I WAS ON VACATION OVER HERE.

15

AND I WORKED THE MONTH OF DECEMBER.

THE WHOLE MONTH OF

DECEMBER I WENT BACK,

16

Q

WHERE?

17

A

AT HOT AUTOMOTIVE.

18

Q

DOING WHAT?

19

A

YOU KNOW, MECHANIC ON CARS.

20

Q

OKAY.

21

A

I CAME OVER HERE TO UTAH ON VACATION AGAIN ON THE

22

FOR HOW LONG?

6TH OF JAN -- JANUARY.

23

Q

THIS WAS '93?

24

A

CORRECT.

25

Q

OKAY.

AND HOW LONG WERE YOU ON VACATION?
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1

A

I GUESS I STILL AM.

2

Q

OKAY.

3

A

I WORKED FOR KELLY SERVICES FOR TWO TO THREE

4
5

WEEKS.

YOU HAVEN'T GONE BACK TO ANY WORK?

I WORKED OUT AT A PLACE CALL FAB-ALL (SIC) ACTUALLY.
Q

WELL, OKAY.

ANYWAY, THE -- THE INCIDENT THAT YOU

6

DESCRIBED WHERE YOU SLIPPED ON THE ICE WHEN YOU WERE GETTING

7

OUT OF YOUR CAR --

8

A

UH-HUM.

(AFFIRMATIVE.)

9

Q

-- YOU INDICATED THAT -- THAT YOU WERE IN A

10

DRIVEWAY; THAT THE DRIVEWAY WAS ON AN INCLINE.

11

CORRECT?

IS THAT

12

A

YEAH.

13

Q

AND THERE WAS ICE ON THE DRIVEWAY?

14

A

YES.

15

Q

WAS THE DRIVEWAY SURFACE WHERE YOU SLID -- WAS

16

THAT ASPHALT OR -- OR CEMENT?

17

A

CEMENT.

18

Q

AND YOU SAID YOU -- WHEN YOU SLIPPED YOUR -- YOU

19

FELT YOUR KNEE POP?

20

A

IT POPPED OUT, YES.

21

Q

UH-HUM, AND YOU -- YOU FELL DOWN.

22

DID YOU FEEL

PAIN IN YOUR KNEE AT THE TIME?

23

A

VERY MUCH SO.

24

Q

VERY MUCH SO?

25

A

YES.

ROCKY MOUNTAIN REPORTING SERVICE, INC.
TEN EXCHANGE PLACE, SUITE 322
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84111
(801) 531-0256
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ADDENDUM B:

FINDING OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER

INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
Case No. 93-561
•

DAVID WARDROP,

*
Applicant,

VS.
BROWN & ROOT INDUSTRIAL
SERVICE/HIGHLANDS INSURANCE
(Black, Nicols & Guiver =
Adjustor),
Defendants•

*

FINDINGS OF FACT

*

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

*
*
*
*

AND ORDER

*

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

HEARING:

Hearing Room 332, Industrial Commission of Utah,
160 East 300 South, Salt Lake City, Utah, on
January 31, 1994 at 10:00 o'clock a.m.
Said
hearing was pursuant to Order and Notice of the
Commission.

BEFORE:

Barbara Elicerio, Administrative Law Judge.

APPEARANCES:

The applicant was present and was represented by G.
Scott Jensen, Attorney.
The defendants were represented by Stuart Poleman,
Attorney.

This case involves a claim for benefits associated with a
proposed surgery on the applicant's right knee. The applicant
claims that the cause of the need for the surgery is an April 23,
1987 industrial right knee injury.
The adjustor originally
accepted liability for the knee injury and paid medical expenses
and temporary total compensation (TTC) from July 14, 1987 through
July 27, 1987 while the applicant recovered from an arthroscopic
surgery on the right knee. Payment of medical expenses continued
through some time in 1988 and then no further medical expenses were
incurred until 1992. The adjustor declined to pay further expenses
in 1992 because: 1) the applicant went more than 3 years without
incurring or submitting related medical expenses and per the
current reading of U.C.A. 35-1-98(1) this causes the applicant's
medical benefit entitlement to cease and 2) the applicant sustained
a subsequent non-industrial injury that caused aggravation to the
right knee and caused the need for the more recent recommendation
for surgery.
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The applicants testimony was taken at the hearing and a
medical record exhibit (Exhibit D-l) was entered into evidence at
that time. Other exhibits entered into evidence at the hearing
include: Exhibit D-2 (the employer's first report of work injury)
and Exhibit D-3 (a written notarized statement apparently signed by
the applicant's prior employer in Colorado). At the close of the
hearing, counsel for the defendants indicated that he wanted to
submit an audio tape of the applicant's recorded statement taken by
the adjustor in June of 1987. Counsel for the applicant objected
to admitting the tape. The ALJ indicated that counsel for the
defendant should have a written transcript of the tape prepared
post-hearing and should provide the applicant and his attorney with
a copy of the transcript. After counsel for the applicant reviewed
the transcript, the ALJ determined that he would be allowed to
submit to the ALJ any objections he had to the admission of the
transcript and could request a second hearing for cross examination
of the adjustor who recorded the statement. On February 9, 1994,
counsel for the defendants wrote the ALJ and indicated that he had
decided not to request admission of the audio tape or a transcript
of the tape. As such, the ALJ wrote counsel for the applicant on
February 23, 1994 and indicated that she would consider the matter
ready for order as of the date that counsel for the defendants'
letter arrived at the Commission (February 9, 1994).

FINDINGS OF FACT:
The applicant is a male who was 24 years old on the date of
injury, April 23, 1987, and who had no spouse at that time, but had
one minor child dependent upon him for support. The applicant was
working for Brown & Root Industrial Service (also listed as Brown
& Root Construction or Brown & Root USA) as a laborer on April 23,
1987 and had been so employed for 3 weeks on the date of injury.
The applicant was working 40 hours per week and was earning either
$5.50/hour or $5.63/hour at that time. The applicant testified
that on April 23, 1987, he was working on building a burn plant and
was assigned to clean mud and water out of a pit so that a sump
pump could be installed. The applicant explained that the laborers
were using 5-gallon buckets to transfer the mud and water up out of
the pit. The applicant estimated that the pit was 10 to 12 feet
deep and he indicated that he had to use a rope to get down into
the pit. At one point, £he applicant was climbing up out of the
pit using the rope, and he slipped and fell back into the pit,
landing with his right,leg on top of an overturned 5-gallon bucket.
The applicant stated that this fall jarred the knee and caused it
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to pop. He stated that it was painful for a while, but he managed
to complete his shift that day. The applicant recalls that he
reported the injury to his supervisor before leaving work and also
spoke to him on the phone after he got home.
The applicant continued to work, doing his normal duties
after the date of injury. Then, apparently on May 4, 1987, the
applicant was throwing a large box up into a dumpster and the right
knee "locked" on him.
Apparently, his supervisor took him to
Tanner Memorial Clinic, in Layton, Utah, on that day, and the
applicant was seen by Dr. P. Taylor, a family practitioner. Dr.
Taylor's office note describes the original injury on April 23,
1987 and diagnoses a right knee strain.
Dr. Taylor found no
specific point tenderness, but did note discomfort along the
medical collateral ligament. A knee X-ray was read as normal. Dr.
Taylor determined that the applicant could return to work right
away, with no running, jumping or heavy lifting. Once again, the
applicant returned to work, apparently for another 3 weeks, and
then he decided to to get a second opinion regarding his knee from
Dr. C. Bean, an orthopedist at the Tanner Memorial Clinic.
The applicant saw Dr. Bean on May 28, 1987 and his office
note of that date indicates that the applicant had persistent pain
and stiffness after the initial injury and had persistent medical
joint pain and repeated minor strains after the box throwing
incident. Dr. Bean's diagnostic impression was: 1) torn medial
meniscus and 2) torn anterior cruciate, partial v. complete tear.
He recommended light duty and prescribed tolectin. He noted that
if there was no improvement within the next 6 weeks, he would
recommend arthroscopic surgery. The applicant testified at hearing
that when he requested light duty with Brown & Root, he was
terminated.
After seeing Dr. Bean, the applicant apparently contacted
the adjustor and he testified at hearing that the adjustor agreed
to send him to Dr. C. Gabbert, an orthopedic surgeon in Ogden,
Utah. Dr. Gabbert saw the applicant on July 1, 1987, and he noted
that the discomfort that the applicant had at that time was on the
medical aspect of the knee. He noted that the applicant had had 3
or 4 episodes of locking, where it was necessary to massage the
knee in order to get it to straighten out. He also noted that the
applicant had a feeling of instability in the knee and that it was
bothersome going up and down stairs. Dr. Gabbert diagnosed a
probable torn meniscus and he recommended arthroscopic surgery.
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The surgery was performed at McKay Dee Hospital on July 14, 1987.
The operative report indicates that no lateral or medial meniscus
tears were found and that the anterior cruciate ligament was in
tact. The post-operative diagnosis was: no pathology found.
The applicant testified that he continued to have the
locking problems post-surgery and even fell down once when he tried
to stand up from a sitting position and the knee locked. He stated
that Dr. Gabbert did not prescribe any kind of exercises for the
knee and did not tell him to restrict his activities in any way.
Dr. Gabbert's July 23, 1987 office note indicates that the
applicant was progressing satisfactorily and that the applicant was
released to return to work on July 27, 1987. However, when he saw
him again on August 19, 1987, he noted that the applicant was still
having some discomfort, especially when working with torque or when
he kneeled directly on the knee.
Dr. Gabbert noted that the
applicant could walk without any noticeable problem, that he had no
swelling or ligamentous instability, that he had full range of
motion and that he had good quad function. At that point, his
office note indicates that he recommended isometric quad
strengthening for what he considered to be subjective knee
discomfort of uncertain etiology.
On September 21, 1987, Dr.
Gabbert wrote the adjustor and indicated that he anticipated no
permanent impairment to the right knee.
Per the applicant's testimony, he spoke with the adjustor
again in late September or early October of 1987. The applicant
testified that the adjustor allowed him to select another
specialist for consultation, as he was still having problems with
the right knee.
The applicant saw Dr. L. M. Janeway, an
orthopedist at Ogden Clinic on October 28, 1987.
There is a
handwritten office note for that date and a Physician's Initial
Report of Work Injury form. The office note is mostly illegible,
but the form indicates that the applicant had mild joint effusion,
mild anterior cruciate ligament laxity and medial joint tenderness,
associated with an April 1987 fall into a sump pump hole. The
diagnosis indicated on the form is: disruption of right knee
anterior cruciate ligament. The form indicates that Dr. Janeway
felt that the knee required further evaluation and probable
surgery. Dr. Janeway's office note indicates that the applicant
did not show up for his next appointment on November 6, 1987. The
applicant testified at hearing that Dr. Janeway told him he should
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just do exercises and that he might need surgery in the future. He
stated that Dr. Janeway told him that the knee would get worse, but
that he could hold off on the surgery, because the knee was not
that bad at that time.
It is unclear what the applicant did
between late October 1987 and March of 1988.
On March 5, 1988, Dr. Janeway saw the applicant again and
wrote the adjustor. In that letter, Dr. Janeway notes that the
applicants right knee was still painful, especially with attempts
at increased activity.
He notes the applicant's symptoms to
include knee pain and thigh numbness with prolonged sitting and
occasional locking with increased pain going up and down stairs.
Dr. Janeway notes that, at that time, he prescribed feldene and
instructed the applicant to return to him in one week for further
evaluation. The letter to the adjustor notes that Dr. Janeway
believed that the applicant had an anterior cruciate ligament
injury which would continue to stretch and cause increased knee
instability. He notes that he suspected that the applicant would
need a brace and/or reconstructive surgery, because one year had
gone by since the date of injury and he did not believe that time
alone would return the applicant to normal knee function. Once
again, it is unclear what the applicant was doing at this
particular time, but as of June of 1988, he got a job in Ogden,
Utah at Goodyear, acting as the Assistant Manager there for about
one year.
Sometime in the latter half of 1989, the applicant moved to
Colorado and initially worked at Bailey Tire for an unspecified
period of time. He then got a job with Metric Automotive and
worked there until August of 1992. However, in January of 1992,
the applicant had an aggravating incident to his right knee. The
applicant testified that on January 27, 1992, he was getting out of
his car, in his inclining driveway, when his right foot slipped on
some ice on the ground and he fell to the ground. The applicant
stated that he feels that the right knee instability that he had
been having since 1987 contributed to the fall. He apparently went
to see Dr. P. Sillix, D.O., on the same day, and he completed a
form there which indicates that his injury was "slipped on ice
running." At hearing, the applicant tesified that he did sign the
form in the medical record exhibit and did complete the form. He
admits writing "slipped on ice" but he denies that he wrote
"running" on the form. The applicant testified that he never did
see Dr. Sillix, because he was called away to the hospital.
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The applicant testified that he called the adjustor some
time after his fall and told her that he had reinjured the knee.
He testified that the adjustor gave him permission to see Dr. D.
Mayer, a physician associated with Grand Junction Orthopedic
Associates, in Grand Junction, Colorado. The applicant saw Dr.
Mayer on March 4, 1992. Dr. Mayers office note of that date
indicates that the applicant had been having persistent problems
with the right knee since the 1987 injury. He notes that the
applicant had persistent pain with any activity and that he fell
down with pain any time he did a pivotal shift. He noted that this
had occurred one week ago and that the applicant had seen Dr.
Sillix as a result (perhaps meaning one month ago). Dr. Mayer
diagnosed an anterior cruciate insufficient right knee with
probable stretched out anterior cruciate ligament which was
essentially non-functional. He noted that he planned arthroscopic
surgery with a partial medial menisectomy and reconstruction of the
anterior cruciate ligament, if it was significiantly stretched out.
Despite these plans, he completed a "work capacity/disability
report" on March 5, 1992 and he found that the applicant could
return to work without restrictions at that time. The applicant
tesitified that when he notified the adjustor regarding Dr. Mayer's
recommendations, he was initially told that further details would
be necessary. However, he stated that he was later told that the
surgery would not be authorized. The applicant stated that he
could not afford the time off for the surgery at that time if he
could not get compensation (Dr. Mayer had told him that there would
be a year of rehabilitation after the surgery) and thus he decided
not to pursue the surgery.
The applicant continued to work at Metric Automotive until
August of 1992 and then he testified that he painted cars for the
owner of Metric Automotive through October of 1992. He stated that
he was on a vacation to Utah during November of 1992, and then
returned to Colorado and worked for Hot Automotive as a
mechanic/painter during December 1992. In January of 1993, he was
again in Utah for a vacation and he stated that he saw an attorney
regarding the knee surgery at that time. The applicant filed his
application for hearing in May of 1993 and in October of 1993 he
was seen by Dr. G. Zeluff, an orthopedist, at the request of the
adjustor. At that point, Dr. Zeluff had most of the applicant's
medical records for review, but did not have Dr. C. Bean's records.
On examination of the applicant, Dr. Zeluff noted that the
applicant definitely appeared to have an anterior cruciate ligament
insufficiency and some ^continuing damage to the medical meniscus.
He noted that "this" could be synovial swelling in the medial
compartment of the knee. Dr. Zeluff noted that Dr. Bean's apparent

ORDER
RE: DAVID WARDROP
PAGE 7

findings conflicted with Dr. Gabbert's, in that Dr. Bean apparently
diagnosed an anterior cruciate problem shortly after the April 1987
industrial fall, while Dr. Gabbert found no problem with the
anterior cruciate on arthroscopy.
Dr. Zeluff explains that an
anterior cruciate ligament can look normal on arthroscopic
examination when in fact it is unstable.
He concluded that,
without Dr. Bean's records, and relying on Dr. Gabbert's findings,
he would have to say that the applicant had a normal anterior
cruciate ligament after the April 1987 fall, with the more recent
findings of insufficiency in that ligament being the result of one
of the later twisting injuries to the knee, like the fall on the
ice in January of 1992.
Dr. Zeluff was later supplied with the records of Dr. Bean.
He did an addendum report to clarify his conclusions after
reviewing the records. That clarification report is dated December
30, 1993. In that report, Dr. Zeluff notes that Dr. Bean felt
there was an anterior cruciate tear, OR partial tear, at the time
of his examination. Dr. Zeluff explains that partial tears are
very hard to diagnose from testing or arthroscopic surgery. Based
on this new information, Dr. Zeluff revised his conclusion to state
that he felt there was a strong possibility that there was a
partial tear to the anterior cruciate ligament in May of 1987, when
Dr. Bean examined the applicant. However, Dr. Zeluffs ultimate
conclusion was that the additional twisting injuries that the
applicant suffered after the April 1987 fall, especially the fall
on the ice in January of 1992, aggravated the tear and completed
it.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:
The Three-Year Statute of Limitations:
The defendants' first defense is that the applicant's claim
for additional medical expenses related to the proposed surgery is
barred by the statutory provision specifying a three-year statute
of limitations for medical expenses. This three-year limitation
was first specified in U.C.A. 35-1-99(2) as it was amended in 1988,
That provision is now located in U.C.A. 35-1-98(1), as it was
amended in 1990, and reads in pertinent part as follows:
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... an employee's medical benefit entitlement
ceases if the employee does not incur medical
expenses reasonably related to the industrial
accident and submit those expenses to his employer
or insurance carrier for payment/ for a period of
three consecutive years.
The ALJ finds that if that statutory provision was in effect at the
date of the applicant's injury, it would probably bar the applicant
from any claim for additional expenses after 1991. However, that
provision was not in effect on April 23, 1987, having first become
effective in 1988. Applying the well established principal that it
is the law on the date of injury that applies, the ALJ finds that
the above-cited provision does not apply to the applicant's claim,
because it was passed and became effective after the applicant had
his April 23, 1987 industrial injury. The ALJ must therefore
dismiss the defendants' first defense.
Subsequent Accident Compensability:
The defendants argue that the cause of the most recent
recommendation for surgery is the January 27, 1992 non-industrial
fall and not the April 23, 1987 industrial accident (per Dr.
Zeluff). The applicant claims that the cause of the most recent
recommendation for surgery is the April 23, 1987 industrial
accident, as it was noted as early as March of 1988 that the
surgery would be needed eventually as treatment for the industrial
accident (per Dr. Janeway) . The conclusions of Dr. Zeluff and Dr.
Janeway could be seen as controverting opinions, warranting a
referral to a medical panel for addtional input. However, Dr.
Janeway is unaware of the January 27, 1992 accident and it is
unclear whether he would feel that this subsequent accident
aggravated the anterior cruciate ligament (ACL) injury. Thereforef
it is not clear that there is any controversy regarding whether an
aggravation occurred in January of 1992. This makes the need of
additional medical input less clear.
In addition, claifying
whether or not an aggravation did occur appears to be unnecessary*
This is true because the ALJ finds that, even presuming that the
1995 fall aggravated the injury caused by the April 1987 industrial
fall, the effects of that aggravation are compensable.
Professor Larson has stated the rule on compensability of
subsequent accidents to be as follows:
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When the primary injury is shown to have arisen out
of and in the course of employment, every natural
consequence that flows from the injury likewise
arises out of the employment, unless it is the
result of an
independent
intervening cause
attributable to the claimant's own intentional
conduct.
A. Larson, Workmen's Compensation, §13.00 (Desk Ed. 1988). In
discussing complications that follow the initial or primary injury,
Larson cites a Utah case, Perchelli v. Utah State Indus. Comm'n,
475 P.2d 835 (Utah 1970), in which it was determined that a sneeze
following an industrial back injury (which sneeze caused the need
for surgery to the back) was compensable. Larson states:
The case should be no different if the triggering
epidsode is some nonemployment exertion like
raising a window or hanging up a suit, so long as
it is clear that the real operative factor is the
progression of the compensble injury, associated
with an exertion that in itself would not be
unreasonable in the circumstances.
A. Larson, supra, §13.11(a).
Larson also notes a category of
subsequent injuries that he refers to as "weakened member
contributing to later fall or other injury.11 Id. §13.12. Larson
states:
Where the question of intervening cause has arisen
in the category of cases covered by this
subsection, it has usually been held that the
claimant's negligent act broke the chain of
causation. ... As to what constitutes negligence,
in these cases it often takes the form of rashly
undertaking a line of action with knowledge of the
risk created by the weakened member.
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In addition to the discussion by Larson regarding subsequent
accident compensability, there is just one Utah case that is
particularly on point. That case is Mountain States Casing v.
McKean, 706 P.2d 601 (Utah 1985) and involved a work injury causing
loss of sensation in the hand, which the injured worker later
burned severely, partially because the loss of sensation prevented
him from feeling the burn. The Court in that case states:
A subseqent injury is compensable if it is found to
be a natural result of a compensable primary
injury. McKean is not required to show that his
original tragedy was the sole cause of a subsequent
injury, but only that the initial work-related
accident was a contributing cause of his subsequent
hand injury.
Although this seems to be more generous in finding compensability
than the Larson rule, the Court in McKean does go on to note that
the applicant's subsequent activity was not negligent or
intentional, so that it appears that the Court is adopting a rule
similar to what Larson notes as appropriate.
Applying the above-stated "rules" to the instant facts, it
would appear that if the applicant was merely getting out of the
car when his right leg gave way, partially due to the ice and
partially due to the longstanding effects of the 1987 injury to the
ACL, any resulting aggravation to the ACL caused by the fall that
followed would be compensable. This would be true, because getting
but of the car was not an unreasonable or negligent act, and
because the inital work related accident was a contributing cause
of the fall that occurred after getting out of the car. On the
other hand, if the fall occurred because the applicant was running
on the ice, as is suggested by the form completed at Dr. Sillix's
office, the effects of the fall could be non-compensable. This is
because the fall might then be considered to be the result of an
intentional and negligent act, that was a rash undertaking
considering the fact that the applicant knew that the right leg
occasionally gave way or locked.
The ALJ finds that the applicant was not running on the ice
when the fall occurred in January of 1992 and was actually getting
out of the car when he slipped on the ice and possibly aggravated
the ACL injury that he incurred as a result of the industrial fall
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at issue on April 23, 1987. The ALJ makes this conclusion because
the form from Dr. Sillix's office contains the only reference to
running on the ice that has been submitted and there is no other
confirmation that the applicant was running on the ice when he fell
in 1992. The applicant testified that he was getting out of the
car in his driveway when he fell on the ice and he denies that he
was running on the ice when the fall occurred. The defendants have
not argued strenuously that the fall occurred while the applicant
was running and have offered no evidence that would confirm that
the applicant was running when he fell.
In addition, the
defendants presented written argument regarding the compensability
of the fall in a post-hearing letter which is based on the
applicant falling after getting out of the car.
Because the ALJ finds that the applicant fell on January 27,
1992 after getting out of his car, partially as a result of ice on
the driveway and partially as a result of the effects of the April
23, 1987 injury to the ACL (causing locking and giving way of the
knee) , the ALJ finds that any aggravation to the right knee caused
by the January 1992 fall is compensable as a "natural consequence"
flowing from the April 23, 1987 fall. This conclusion is based
upon the discussion regarding subsequent injuries in Professor
Larson's treatise and the adoption of the Larson rule by the Utah
Supreme Court, as noted in the McKean case cited above. The ALJ
should point out that she makes no ruling regarding whether or not
an actual aggravation to the knee occurred on January 27, 1992.
The ALJ simply finds that even if one did occur, it does not break
the chain of causation between the April 23, 1987 fall and the
current recommendation for surgery. Dr. Janeway did note as early
as March of 1988 that the need for reconstructive surgery was
anticipated at that point and that the ACL would continue to
stretch with additional instability in the knee occurring simply as
a result of the passage of time.
Certainly, one legitimate
interpretation of the medical records in this case is that, per Dr.
Janeway's prediction, the ACL simply worsened with time and now
requires surgery. However, as noted above, even if a subsequent
aggravation (in January of 1992) is causing the need for the nowrecommended surgery, that aggravation is compensable.
Based on the foregoing conclusions, the defendants should
pay for the reconstructive surgery to the right knee that is
currently recommended and should pay the applicant temporary total
compensation (TTC) during his recovery from the surgery.
The
defendants should withhold 20% of the applicant's TTC for payment
to the applicant's attorney once the applicant has stabilized.
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ORDER:
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the defendants, Brown & Root
Industrial Service/Highlands Insurance (Black, Nicols & Guiver Adjustor), pay the applicant, David Wardrop, temporary total
compensation during the period of his medical instability following
the reconstructive surgery to the right knee that will be performed
at a future date.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the defendants, Brown & Root
Industrial Service/Highlands Insurance (Black, Nicols & Guiver Adjustor), pay all medical expenses incurred as the result of the
April 23, 1987 industrial accident, including those expenses
related to the reconstructive surgery to the right knee that will
be performed at a future date; said expenses to be paid in
accordance with the medical and surgical fee schedule of the
Industrial Commission of Utah.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the defendants, Brown & Root
Industrial Service/Highlands Insurance (Black, Nicols & Guiver Adjustor), pay G. Scott Jensen, attorney for the applicant,
attorney fees witheld from the applicants temporary total
compensation to be paid in the future, in an amount consistent with
the Commission rule R568-1-7, for services rendered in this matter,
the same to be paid in a lump sum at the time that the applicant
stabilizes.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any Motion for Review of the
foregoing shall be filed in writing within thirty (30) days of the
date hereof, specifying in detail the particular errors and
objections, and, unless so filed, this Order shall be final and not
subject to review or appeal* In the event a Motion for Review is
timely filed, the parties shall have fifteen (15) days from the
date of filing with the Commission, in which to file a written
response with the Commission in accordance with Section 63-46b12(2) Utah Code Annotated.
DATED this 1^7 day of March, 1994.

Barbara Elicerio
Administrative Law Judge
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MAILING CERTIFICATE

I certify that on March \^1
, 1994, a copy of the attached
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order, in the case of
David Wardrop, was mailed to the following persons at the following
addresses, postage paid:
David Wardrop
406 Colonial
Layton, UT 84041
G. Scott Jensen
Attorney at Law
205 26th Street, #34
Ogden, UT 84401
Stuart Poelman
Attorney at Law
P O Box 45000
SLC, UT 84145
Highlands Insurance
Black, Nichols and Guiver
c/o James Black
P O Box 2615
SLC UT 84110-2615

INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH

Wilma Burrows
Adjudication Division
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ADDENDUM C:

DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR REVIEW

INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
Case No. 93-561

DAVID WARDROP,
Applicant,

DEFENDANTS1 MOTION FOR REVIEW

BROWN & ROOT INDUSTRIAL
SERVICE/HIGHLANDS INSURANCE
(Black, Nichols & Guiver,
Adjustor),
Defendants.

Pursuant to the provisions of §35-1-82.53 of the Utah Code,
defendants move the Commission for its review of Findings of
Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order herein dated March 17, 1994,
as follows:
FACTS
The basic facts describing this proceeding and the evidence
presented is substantially outlined in the Findings of Fact
issued by the Administrative Law Judge herein and, thus, will not
be restated here.

The proper application of the facts as

contained in the record will be referenced in the argument set
forth below.
ARGUMENT
The industrial accident which occurred on April 23, 1987,
while the applicant was working for Brown & Root, simply
consisted of his slipping back into a hole out of which the
applicant was climbing and allegedly feeling some pain in his
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As shown by the medical records, he did hot "seek!"

treatment for his knee until some 11 days later when ccrr Jf^y 4,
1987, he went to the Tanner Clinic.
and he was returned to work.

There his knee wab ir-Yayed,

Then some three-plus weeks

thereafter, he went on his own to see Dr. Bean who recommended
arthroscopic examination in order to determine the extent of
injury.

Inspection of ligaments and the lateral and medial

meniscus was performed by arthroscopic examination by Dr. Gabbert
on July 14, 1987. He found the ligaments intact and no tears in
either the lateral or medial meniscus.

No pathology was found.

Followup reports of Dr. Gabbert reported normal walking, no
swelling nor ligamentous instability, full range of motion and
good quad function, and no anticipated permanent impairment.
Although the applicant did consult with Dr. Janeway in October
1987, and March 1988, it is not known that Dr. Janeway was
provided with the prior records of Dr. Gabbert in order to
confirm or dispute Dr. Gabbertfs findings.

In any event, the

applicant did, over the next several years, work for different
employers in jobs requiring the active use of his right knee, and
he did so without the need for any additional medical treatment
nor any reported impairment with respect to his work activity or
other lifefs activities.
D-3].)

(J3ee Affidavit of Darin Carei [Exhibit

Thus, the evidence presented requires one to conclude

that the industrial accident of April 23, 1987, was not severe,
was adequately treated and that no pathology resulted as was
2
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determined by a visual inspection of the knee made* pursuant £o
arthroscopic examination.

•;• •*.

It was not until after the applicant sustained a»" *•*
nonindustrial injury to his right knee on January 27, 1992, that
additional treatment and surgery on the knee was

prescribed.

On

that date, while stepping out of his car upon a sloping, icecovered cement driveway, the applicant's foot slipped out from
under him causing the leg to extend out from underneath him and
causing him to fall to the ground.

There is no question but what

said accident was severe in its trauma and that it caused
substantial injury to the knee.

The applicant testified that at

the time of said accident, he felt a popping and experienced
severe pain in the knee.

He further testified that substantial

swelling ensued which required him to pack his knee with ice for
a period of about ten hours.

Thus, both the accident and the

injury which occurred on 1/27/92 can, based upon the evidence
presented, only be found to be both substantial and independent
of the applicant's prior knee injury which had occurred almost
five years before.

It is submitted that there is no substantial

evidence in the record from which one can conclude that the
applicant's foot slipped out from under him on the icy driveway
because of any weakness attributable to the prior industrial
accident.

The applicant's foot slipped on the ice because of the

ice—not because of any weakness in the knee.

The applicant has

produced no substantial evidence to prove otherwise. He
3
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certainly has not produced a preponderance of evidence**on that
fact, which is his burden.

•;• # \

Defendants have no quarrel with the principle citkd'Uy the
Administrative Law Judge in citing Larson.

Note, however, that

Larson finds compensable "every natural consequence that flows
from the injury..."

It can hardly be said that the applicant's

slipping and falling on an icy cement driveway was the "natural
consequence" of his prior industrial injury.

It is also

instructive that Larson indicates that the triggering occurrence
may be found to be compensable "so long as it is clear that the
real operative factor is the progression of the compensable
injury."

In this case, it is far from "clear" that the injury

which the applicant sustained in January 1992, is "the
progression of the compensable injury."
It would appear that the Administrative Law Judge has become
distracted in her analysis of the facts of this case as it
relates to the law cited by Larson.

In the instant case, it is

irrelevant as to whether or not the applicant's slipping on the
ice in January 1992, was a negligent or intentional act since the
relevant focus should not be upon the nature of the act but
rather the cause of the occurrence.

In this case, there is no

substantial evidence that the applicant's slipping on the ice was
in any way caused by industrial injury which occurred in 1987..
It is submitted that the Administrative Law Judge also erred
in failing to refer this matter to a medical panel for a
4

• • •

determination of the medical issues.

Since the arthroscopic••

examination of the applicants knee in 1987 revealed *>o#\
pathology," then it cannot be assumed that any patholcfigy*Existed.
The mere fact that Dr. Zeluff, who examined applicant in 1993,
speculated that there was a "strong possibility" that there was a
partial tear of the anterior cruciate ligament in May 1987, does
not satisfy the applicant's burden of proof to the effect that
there was. The preponderance of the evidence is that there was
no pathology to the applicant's anterior cruciate ligament as
determined by the visual inspection of Dr. Gabbert in 1987. Any
opinion to the contrary is, in fact, speculative.

It is

certainly beyond the expertise of the Administrative Law Judge to
resolve that medical question.
It is instructive that the Administrative Law Judge refuses
to make a finding with respect to whether or not the injury of
1992 was an "actual aggravation" of a pre-existing condition
since there is no substantial evidence to support such a finding.
There is, on the other hand, a clear demonstration by the
evidence that the 1992 accident caused a new and different injury
and that this new injury is what creates the need for the
prescribed surgery.
The primary object of the application in this proceeding is
to require the defendants to pay for the prescribed surgery.

The

evidence taken as a whole does not preponderate in favor of a
finding that the surgery is necessitated because of an industrial
5

*» n o
o

accident in 1987. On the other hand, it strongly fcreiJonderates
in favor of a finding that applicants accident in Jaijna^y 1992,
was the event that requires the prospective surgery, .IrhV
prospective surgery is for the purpose of repairing a torn
anterior cruciate ligament and a torn medial meniscus. None of
that pathology can be demonstrated to have occurred as a result
of the 1987 industrial accident.
the 1992 accident.

It was clearly the result of

There is no definitive evidence that the

prescribed surgery would have been necessary had it not been for
the 1992 accident.
It is submitted that the Administrative Law Judge also erred
in refusing to allow the defendants to pursue inquiry at the
hearing concerning the applicants criminal record.

To the

extent that the Administrative Law Judge relied upon the
testimony of the applicant, then his credibility is at issue and
his criminal record is a relevant matter for consideration in
that regard.

During the course of the hearing, the defendants

demonstrated that the applicant had been twice convicted of a
crime; but the applicant's objection to further examination on
his further criminal record was sustained, and the defendants
were precluded from making a record on his criminal background.
It is also submitted that the Administrative Law Judge erred
in ruling that the three-year statute of limitations relating to
medical care does not bar the applicant's claim for additional
medical expenses.

Since the three-year statute of limitations
6

••• • :%

••

•

• ••
•

• •
• ••
• •••

became effective on July 1, 1988, and the applicant d*d not incur*
and submit for payment any further medical expenses fior a period
•

••

of at least three years thereafter, the limitation wojijjrf.apply to
the instant case if it is determined that the statute is
procedural in nature.

If so, it is applicable to all industrial

accidents whether those accidents occurred before or after the
enactment of the statute unless some prejudice can be
demonstrated.

The Supreme Court has ruled that statutes of

limitations are procedural in nature and, therefore, can be
applied retroactively.

Certainly, in this case, the applicant

should be treated no differently because his industrial accident
occurred in 1987 as opposed to someone whose industrial accident
occurred after July 1, 1988.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing arguments, it is submitted that the
Order requiring the defendants to pay for the applicant's
prescribed surgery is in error, is not based upon a preponderance
of evidence, and should be reversed.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this
}£ *
day of April, 1994.
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU

C
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Stuart L. Poelman
Attorneys for Defendants
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Gloriann Egan being duly sworn, says that she is employed by
the law offices of Snow, Christensen & Martineau, attorneys for
defendants Brown & Root and Highlands Insurance herein; that she
served the attached DEFENDANTS1 MOTION FOR REVIEW (Case Number
93-561, Utah State Industrial Commission) upon the parties listed
below by placing a true and correct copy thereof in an envelope
addressed to:
G. Scott Jensen, Esq.
205 26th Street #34
Ogden, Utah 84401
and causing the same to be mailed first class, postage prepaid,
on the /Z2

day of April, 1994.

CX^
Gloriann Egan
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this

73^ day

of April,

1994.
}
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ingipf the State of Utah
My Commission Expires:

Qix&n

Cynthia Northttrom
10 CMMi^i « • » , 11tti Fir
MtUtatClty.Utilt M111
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STATE OF UTAH

ADDENDUM D:

ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR REVIEW

THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
DAVID WARDROP,

*
*

Applicant,
VS.

*
*
*

BROWN & ROOT INDUSTRIAL
SERVICE and HIGHLAND
INSURANCE,
Defendants.

*
*
*
*

ORDER DENYING
MOTION FOR REVIEW

*

Case No. 93-0561

Brown & Root Industrial Service and its insurance carrier,
Highland Insurance (referred to jointly hereafter as "Brown &
Root") ask The Industrial Commission of Utah to review an
Administrative Law Judge's Order awarding medical expenses and
temporary total disability compensation to David Wardrop in
connection with anticipated surgery to Mr. Wardrop's right knee.
The Commission exercises jurisdiction over this Motion For
Review pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-12, Utah Code Ann. §35-182.53 and Utah Admin. Code R568-1-4.M.
FINDINGS OF FACT
The Commission adopts the very thorough findings of fact set
forth in the ALJ's decision. Those facts are summarized below as
background for the Commission's decision.
On April 23, 1987, in the course of his employment by Brown &
Root, Mr. Wardrop fell and injured his right knee. Although his
knee hurt, he continued to work. Ten days later, again in the
course of employment at Brown & Root, his right knee "locked" on
him. He was first examined a Dr. Taylor and diagnosed with "knee
strain." Three weeks later, Dr. Bean, an orthopedist, diagnosed a
torn medial meniscus and damage to the anterior cruciate ligament.
Brown & Root authorized Dr. Gabbert to perform arthroscopic
surgery on Mr. Wardrop's knee. During the surgery, Dr. Gabbert
observed no tears in either the medial meniscus or anterior
cruciate ligament. During subsequent examinations, Dr. Gabbert
noted that Mr. Wardrop continued to experience subjective
discomfort in the knee, but suffered no objective problems.
In October 1987, Brown & Root authorized Dr. Janeway, also an
orthopedist, to examine Mr. Wardrop. Dr. Janeway diagnosed Mr.
Wardrop as suffering from disruption of the anterior cruciate
ligament, associated with his work-related injury. Then, during
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March 1988, Dr. Janeway noted that Mr. Wardrop continued to suffer
pain in the knee, attributable to the damaged anterior cruciate
ligament. Dr. Janeway advised Brown & Root that a brace and/or
surgery would be required to correct the problem. Mr. Wardrop did
not pursue the matter further for the next several years.
On January 27, 1992, as he was stepping out of his car, Mr.
Wardrop's right foot slipped on ice, causing him to fall to the
ground. Brown and Root authorized an orthopedic examination by Dr.
Mayer, who diagnosed a probable stretched anterior cruciate
ligament and concluded that arthroscopic surgery was necessary.
Brown & Root declined liability for the anticipated surgery
and related period of temporary total disability. In response, Mr.
Wardrop filed an Application For Hearing. Brown and Root then
arranged for Dr. Zeluff, an orthopedist, to examine Mr. Wardrop.
Dr. Zeluff found "a strong possibility" that Mr. Wardrop had
suffered an injury to the anterior cruciate ligament of his right
knee as a result of his accident at Brown & Root in 1987, which
injury was then aggravated by Mr. Wardrop's fall on the ice in
1992.
Based on the foregoing facts, the ALJ concluded that Brown &
Root was liable for the anticipated arthroscopic surgery on Mr.
Wardrop,s right knee, as well as temporary total disability
benefits during the time required for healing.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Brown & Root's Motion For Review contends that the ALJ erred
in:
1) concluding that Mr. Wardrop's current knee injury was
caused by the 1987 industrial accident; 2) declining
to refer the
matter to a medical panel; 3) limiting Brown & Root/s inquiry into
Mr. Wardrop's criminal record; and 4) concluding that a three year
statute of limitations adopted in 1988 is inapplicable to this 1987
accident. Each of Root & Brown,s contentions is discussed below.
No one disputes Mr. Waldrop's need for surgery to correct the
damaged anterior cruciate ligament of his right knee. The only
dispute is whether Mr. Waldrop7s knee injury is the result of his
1987 industrial accident and therefore compensable under the Utah
Workers' Compensation Act.
Having reviewed the record, the Commission finds the various
medical opinions to be in substantial agreement that Mr. Waldrop^s
industrial injury of 1987 is the genesis of his current problem.
The Commission therefore affirms the ALJ's conclusion that Mr.
Waldrop is entitled to payment of medical expenses necessary to
treat his current knee problem, as well as associated temporary
disability compensation.
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Brown & Root also argues the ALJ should have referred the
medical aspects of this case to a medical panel. The Commissions
Rule R568-1-9.A. governs the use of medical panels:
A panel will be utilized . . . where:
1) One or more significant medical issues may be
involved. Generally a significant medical issue must be
shown by conflicting medical reports. . . .
As previously noted, the various medical opinions in this case
are in substantial agreement and do not present any significant
medical issue.
The Commission therefore affirms the ALJ's
conclusion that a medical panel is not warranted.
Next, Brown & Root contends the ALJ improperly limited its
questioning of Mr. Wardrop on the subject of his criminal record.
Under Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 609, such examination is
permitted only if the crime in question was of serious magnitude or
involves dishonesty or false statement. From the record provided
to it, the Commission cannot conclude that Mr. Wardrop's alleged
criminal record meets this test of admissibility. Furthermore,
such evidence would be of limited probative value given the
objective facts of this case. The Commission therefore affirms the
ALJ's decision on this point.
Finally, Brown & Root argues the ALJ erred in rejecting its
statute of limitations defense. In particular, Brown & Root points
to Section 35-1-98(1) of the Workers' Compensation Act, which
provides:
. . . an employee's medical benefit entitlement ceases if
the employee does not incur medical expenses reasonably
related to the industrial accident, and submit those
expenses to his employer or insurance carrier for
payment, for a period of three consecutive years.
As noted by the ALJ, had this provision been in effect at the
time of Mr. Wardrop's 1987 accident, it might well bar him from
pursuing his claim, since more than three years has elapsed since
he last submitted medical expenses to Brown & Root. However, as
also noted by the ALJ, it is well settled that the law in effect at
the time of the accident governs the substantive rights of the
parties in a workers' compensation claim. Kennecott v. Industrial
Comm. . 740 P,2d 305, 307 (Utah App 1987) Applying the principle of
Kennecott to this case, Mr. Wardrop's claim is not subject to the
three year statute of limitations added to the Utah Workers'
Compensation Act in 1988.
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ORDER
Based on the foregoing, the Commission affirms the decision of
the Administrative Law Judge and dismisses Brown & Root's Motion
For Review. It is so ordered.
Dated this

ji

day of September, 1994.

^lAv^hu.

S t e p h e n M. Hadl^ey
Chairto^n
WL

A

Thomas R. Carlson
Commissioner

&4^
ColleenS.Colton
Commissioner
ww^

NOTIFICATION OF APPEAL RIGHTS
Any party may ask the Commission to reconsider this Order by
filing a request for reconsideration with the Commission within 20
days of the date of this Order. Alternatively, any party may
appeal this Order by filing a Petition For Review with the Court of
Appeals within 3 0 days of the date of this Order.
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
'1

Y

I certify that on September J 5
, 1994, a copy of the
foregoing ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR REVIEW in the case of David
Wardrop v. Brown & Root Industrial Service and Highland Insurance,
Case No. 93-0561, was mailed postage prepaid, first class, to the
following:
DAVID WARDROP
406 COLONIAL
LAYTON, UTAH 84041
G. SCOTT JENSEN
ATTORNEY AT LAW
205 26TH STREET, #34
OGDEN, UTAH 84401
STUART POELMAN
ATTORNEY AT LAW
P. O. BOX 45000
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84145
HIGHLANDS INSURANCE
BLACK, NICHOLS AND GUIVER
C/O JAMES BLACK
P. O. BOX 2615
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84110-2615
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Diane Kearns \_
Secretary to General Counsel
Industrial Commission of Utah
AHX93-05610
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